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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
TORTS-RIGHT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED CHILD TO
SUE NEGLIGENT PARENT UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954)
Defendant's minor daughter, while a passenger in defendant's
"family purpose" automobile,' was killed in an accident resulting
from the negligence of the driver of the automobile, defendant's minor
son. The children's mother, in her capacity as personal representative
of the deceased daughter, brought suit against the father under the
Kentucky wrongful death statute.2 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
reversing the judgment of the lower court, denied recovery, holding
that the "established" rule that a child cannot sue his parent for a
negligent tort had not been abrogated by the state's wrongful death
statute, which was construed as merely enabling the personal repre-
sentative to bring suit if the deceased could have maintained an action
had she survived.
3
Although there was no definite common law rule regarding the right
of a child to sue his parent for a negligent tort,4 the vast majority of
American cases decided since Hewlett v. Georges have held that a
child cannot maintain an action for negligence against his parent.
As justification for denying recovery, the courts have primarily em-
phasized the disruption of intra-family relations which might result
1. In Kentucky and several other states, when an automobile is maintained
for the general use and convenience of the family the owner is liable for the
negligence of any member of his family who uses the automobile with his per-
mission. In such a situation, the member of the family using the automobile is
considered to be acting as an agent of the owner. See 5A BLASHTIELD, CycLo-
PEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3111 (1954).
2. KY. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (1953).
3. Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
4. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L.
REv. 1030, 1059-62 (1930). It should be noted that in matters affecting wills,
contracts, or other'property rights, a suit may be maintained by a child against
his parent. PROSSER, TORTS 905 (1941),
5. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (189,1) (child denied recovery in action against his
parent for malicious false imprisdnment).
6. While the Hewlett case involved an intentional tort, the rationale adopted
there also has been utilized by the courts as a basis for denying recovery in
negligence cases. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (applying
Maryland law); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; Mesite
v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77 145 Atl. 753 (1929); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass.
480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763(1908); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); Sorrentino
v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928) ; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I.
131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
While the majority of cases similarly have denied recovery when the parent's
tort was intentional, Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133(1937) (wanton act); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (ma-
licious false imprisonment); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905)(father not civilly liable for raping daughter), some recent cases have permitted
the child to recover for intentional torts on the ground that the parent, by his
wanton act, has in effect abandoned the parental relationship. Mahnke v. Moore,
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445(1950). See 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 151, for a discussion of the right of a child to
sue his parent for an intentional tort.
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from such action.' In addition, most courts have held that the mere
fact that the negligent parent is protected by liability insurance does
not alter the general rule, even though allowing an action in such a
situation would not disrupt the family relationship.8
When the parent's negligence causes the death of his child and an
action is brought by the child's personal representative under the
applicable wrongful death statute, the majority of cases have held
that the child's disability to sue also prevents the personal representa-
tive from recovering against the negligent parent., The typical wrong-
ful death statute, however, contains an express provision limiting the
personal representative's right to bring suit to cases in which the de-
ceased could have maintained an action if death had not ensued ;1o the
Kentucky wrongful death statute does not contain such a provision,"
nor had the Kentucky court expressly ruled that a child cannot sue his
parent for a negligent tort. The court in the principal case, therefore,
could have exercised an independent judgment in determining whether
to permit recovery by the child's personal representative.'2
7. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927). For a listing of various "policy factors" which have
been cited by the courts as a basis for denying recovery, see McCurdy Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. Ruv. 1030, 1072-77 (1930);
36 IowA L. Rzv. 384 (1950).
8. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (applying Maryland
law); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A.2d 563 (N.H.
1954).
Some courts have permitted recovery when the negligent parent had liability
insurance and an additional relationship, e.g., master-servant or carrier-passenger,
existed between the parent and child. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At.
905 (1980) (master-servant); Worrel v. Worrel, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939)(carrier-passenger) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) (carrier-
passenger). In these cases, the parent-child relation was considered to be merely
incidental.
9. Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937) ; Chastain
v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Cronin v. Cronin, 244 Wis.
872, 12 N.W.2d 677 (1944).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODS tit. 7, § 123 (1940); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 70, § 1 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1953); Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1953). See 44 HARV. L.
Ry. 980, 983 (1931).
11. The Kentucky statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by the
negligence or wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the
death from the person who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it.
If the act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages may be
recovered. The action shall be prosecuted by the personal representative of
the deceased.
Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 411.130 (1953).
In Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934), the Georgia
court, under a wrongful death statute similar to the Kentucky statute, held that
the personal representative's right to sue is dependent on whether the deceased
could have recovered if he had survived. In denying recovery, the court merely
handled the case as if the action had been brought by the child himself, and did
not attempt to determine if a different rule should apply in a wrongful death
.action under the Georgia statute. See text supported by notes 18-20 infra.
12. In Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950), the same court which
decided the principal case permitted the personal representative- of a deceased
child to maintain a wrongful death action against the negligent parent. While
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Since, in the vast majority of cases, the child's personal representa-
tive is the non-tortious parent it would seem that the same basic rea-
son for denying recovery when a child sues his parent-the disruption
of the family relation'4--could also be used to preclude a wrongful
death action by the child's personal representative. The difficulty is
that the supposed disruption of the family relation is based more on
judicial fantasy than positive fact. 4 Realistically, there are two situa-
tions in which an action would be brought: (1) where the negligent
parent is protected by liability insurance ;15 or (2) where the child, or
his personal representative, is antagonistic to the negligent parent
and seeks to use the opportunity afforded by the latter's negligence to
"wreak vengeance."'I6 In the first situation, allowing the child or his
personal representative to recover would probably promote, rather
than disrupt, the family relationship since the judgment would be
paid by the liability insurer.17 In the second situation, where there is
hostility between the parties, there is no family relation to disrupt by
permitting such an action; the relationship is already discordant. In
addition, it is highly unlikely that the courts will promote domestic
the court in the Hale case gave primary consideration to two other issues notdirectly related to the question of whether a child's disability to sue would prevent
an action by the child's personal representative, the Hale case is indistinguishable,
on its facts, from the principal case. The fact that the court did not consider
the Hale case to be controlling may be partially attributed to the failure of
counsel for the plaintiff in the principal case to submit a brief. In any event, itis clear that the principal case has impliedly overruled the Hale decision.
13. See text supported by note 7 supra.
14. See PRoSSER, TORTS § 99 (1941); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons inDomestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 1030 (1930).
15. The court in the principal case did not definitely state that the negligenq
parent had liability insurance, but the entire tenor of the opinion leaves no doubt
that there was such insurance. Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276, 277-78(Ky. 1954).
If the parent's liability insurance policy contained the usual "omnibus clause"
extending coverage to any person legally operating the automobile with the in-
sured's consent, then plaintiff might have been more successful if she had sued
the driver, defendant's minor son. See Rozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 8N.Y.S.2d 901 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939) ; Munsert
v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938).
In the Munsert case, the personal representative of a child killed by the negligent
driving of the child's minor brother was allowed to sue the minor brother under
the state wrongful death statute. The automobile which the deceased's brother
was driving was owned by his father, and an omnibus clause in the insurance
policy extended coverage to anyone driving with the insured's consent. Recovery
was allowed in this case even though Wisconsin follows the general rule that a
child or his personal representative cannot sue the child's parent for a negligent
tort. Cronin v. Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N.W.2d 677 (1944); Wick v. Wick,192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927). Thus, if suit had been brought in the prin-
cipal case against the driver of the automobile, defendant's minor son, the court
might well have permitted recovery.
16. In a situationt in which the family relationship was harmonious and the
negligent parent did not have liability insurance then, as a practical matter, no
suit would be brought. The possibility that by allowing an action the court
might arouse an intra-family antagonism which otherwise would have remained
dormant is so remote as to be unworthy of serious consideration.
17. See, for example, Worrel v. Worrel, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939);
Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
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harmony in such a situation merely by allowing the parent's tort to go
uncompensated.
Even if it were conceded that a child should not be allowed to re-
cover for injuries resulting from his parent's negligence, the court in
the principal case, under the unusual provisions of Kentucky's wrong-
ful death statute, 8 could have permitted recovery by the child's per-
sonal representative. In theory, a wrongful death action is not merely
an extension of the same cause of action which the deceased could
have maintained had he survived; rather, such an action is a new
cause of action, arising upon the death of the deceased.19 Thus, the
factors which might have prevented recovery by the deceased should
not necessarily preclude an action by the deceased's personal repre-
sentative. The distinction is especially important in the principal
case, since the only reason that the child could not have sued her par-
ent was a personal disability arising from the parent-child relation-
ship, which the court might well have considered to have terminated
with her death.20
While the result of the principal case is clearly in accord with the
majority rule, there can be little justification for the decision. To deny
recovery in a wrongful death action merely because the child might
not have been allowed to recover had she survived is to compound an
already serious error. The problem is whether, under modern condi-
tions, there is any justification for denying either the child or his per-
sonal representative the right to recover damages for the negligence
of the child's parent. In the light of the foregoing considerations, a
judicial re-examination of the basis of the rule is certainly to be de-
sired.
18. KY. RsV. STAT. § 411.130 (1953). See text supported by notes 11-12 supra.
19. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 336 (1935).
20. An analogous situation is found in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,
249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928), where the court held that a wife who was
injured by her husband's negligence could recover from the husband's employer
(the accident occurred while the husband was on the employer's business), even
though she could not have maintained an action against her husband.
The personal disability arising from the family relation should be distinguished
from the situation in which the deceased could not have recovered under any
circumstances, as in a case in which he was contributorily negligent, or had as-
sumed the risk of defendant's tortious conduct. PROSsER, TORTs 966 (1941).
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